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Contracts
FREDERICK M. HART

§4.1. Introduction. None of the contract cases decided during the
1963 SuRVEY year requires extensive comment. This conclusion probably reflects an approval of the manner in which the Supreme .Judicial
Court handled the many issues presented by litigants. In reviewing
a year's judicial production, it is easier to get excited about a decision
that one disapproves.
One trend is worthy of note. From the cases discussed in this and
other chapters, it is apparent that the Court is becoming more sophis~
ticated in its understanding and use of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 1
§4.2. Draws against commission. In Perma-Home Corp. v. Nigro 1
the Supreme Judicial Court was presented with the question of
whether a salesman is required to repay money drawn against his
commissions when the draw exceeds commissions earned at the time
his employment is terminated. The defendant had agreed to supply
the names of prospective customers to the plaintiff in return for a
commission of IO per cent on all sales ultimately made. The defendant was to receive a draw against commissions in the amount of SIOO
per week. According to the facts, no express agreement to repay any
of the advances was made by the defendant. \'Vhen the defendant's
employment was terminated. he had drawn considerably more than he
had earned under the commission arrangement, and this action was
brought to recover the difference.
The Court adopted what it found to be the prevailing rule that "in
absence of an express or implied agreement to repay any excess of
advances over the commissions earned, the emplm·er may not recover
from the employee the amount of the excess." 2 The rationale of this
rule is that the employer and employee are viewed as partaking in a
FREDERICK M. HART is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a member of the District of Columbia and New York ban. He is coauthor of Willier and
Hart, Forms and Procedures Under the Uniform Commercial Code. The author
wish~ to acknowledge the assistance of Edward B. Tarlow in the preparation of
this chapter.
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§4.2. 1196! Mass. Adv. Sh. 977, 191 N.E.2d 745.
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joint venture and it is assumed that some of the risk is assumed by the
employer.
The decision should be compared with the earlier case of Theriault
v. E. L. King & Co.,s which involved a written contract whereunder
the employee was to be paid a commission on all sales made by him.
The term of the contract was one year and the contract provided that
the employee was to be advanced a drawing account of $100 per week,
payable against commissions earned. The employer failed to pay the
draw for a substantial number of weeks and at the end of the year
an action was commenced for its recovery. The Court held that the
employer was not obligated to pay the employee the weekly payment
at the end of the term when there was no showing that the commissions
earned were equal to or exceeded the draw. The parties did not intend
that a minimum salary was guaranteed to the employee. The Court
said that the "advancements have resemblance to a loan which was
to be repaid the defendant at the termination of the agreement to the
extent or amount it was in excess of commissions then earned." •
This language was correctly characterized as dicta by the Court in
Perma-Home, but the two cases are nevertheless difficult to harmonize.
In both, commissions were less than the draw. In one, Theriault, the
employer failed to pay the draw and the Court found that he was
correct. In the other, Perma-Home, the draw was paid and the Court
found that the employer had no right to recover that part of it which
was in excess of the commissions. If, as the Court reasons in PerrnaH ome, the arrangement is in the nature of a joint venture in which
the risk is to be shared, it would appear that the employer's contractual
obligation to advance money each week is his contribution to the
venture and that it should be paid irrespective of whether the expected
gains are realized. On the other hand, if the Court's characterization
of the transaction in Theriault as a loan is basically sound, recovery
should be allowed against the employee at the end of the term when
the draw paid exceeds the commissions earned.
In spite of the apparent inconsistency between the opinions, the result reached in each seems to be right. Perh~ps this is because the
plaintiff does not make an effective showing in either case that the
status quo ought to be disturbed. However, if one must choose between the two opinions, Perma-Home appears the better, and the one
more in line with current authority.
§4.3. Provisions prohibiting assignments. Two cases decided during the 1963 SURVEY year reaffirmed the validity of clauses prohibiting
assignments. Although the enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code will affect the result in both cases, they are worthy of note as
examples of the basic approach of the Massachusetts courts in this
area.
R 282 Mas.,. 109,
4 Id. at ll2, 184

184 N.E. !186 (1935).
N.E. at !187.
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McLaughlin tJ. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co.t involved
a dispute between a trustee in bankruptcy and the assignor of contracts
over the right to money owing the bankrupt-assignor. The bankrupt
had entered into several construction contracts with the Telephone
Company, each of which contained a clause providing: "Neither party
. . . shall assign the contract . . . without the written consent of the
other, nor shall the contractor [the bankrupt] assign any moneys due or
to become due to him hereunder, without the previous written consent
of [the Telephone Company]." Subsequently, the bankrupt delivered
to the United States Trust Company account receivable assignment
forms purporting to assign his contract rights to the bank as security
for loans. When the Trust Company instructed the Telephone Company that ·it was an assignee and should be paid, the Telephone Company objected to the assignment and refused the demand. Upon the
commencement of this action for a declaratory judgment to determine
whether the trustee in bankruptcy or the Trust Company had superior
rights to the money ultimately becoming due from performance of the
contracts, the Telephone Company paid the money into court with
the consent of all parties.
The trustee argued that the assignments were ineffective as against
him because of the nonassignment clause, and claimed a right to the
fund under Sections 70(a) and 60 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. The
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the validity of the nonassignment
clauses, but held that the prohibition was for the benefit of the Telephone Company and did not prevent an assignee from acquiring rights
against the assignor. By implication, the Court also held that the
assignments were perfected for the purposes of Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act as soon as they were made.
Much of the Court's opinion is rendered obsolete by the Uniform
Commercial Code, 2 but there is one point that must be considered in
future transactions. In the course of the opinion, the Court was required to decide whether the assignment was intended to cover only
money owing at the time of the assignment or also money to become
due in the _future. Although the form signed by the contractor used
the term "contracts," it also stated that the accounts were "owing to"
the debtor. Adopting a narrow construction of the agreement, the
Court held that it covered only those owing to the contractor at the
time of the assignments. Since Section 9-106 of the Uniform Com·
mercial Code separately defines accounts and contract rights, it is likely
that the same result would be reached under the Code. The case indicates that any security agreement that is designed to cover both should
clearly describe the collateral as "all present and future contract rights
and accounts of the assignor." a
§4.3. 1345 Mass. 555, 188 N.E.2d 552 (1963).
2 See Willier and Hart, Forms and Procedures Under the Uniform Commercial
Code pars. 91.20, 91.21 (1963).
3 5 B.C. Ind.&: Com. L. Rev. I ii (1963).
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The validity of contractual provisions forbidding assignments was
also at issue in Security National Bank of Springfield v. General Motors
Corp. 4 The Court held that an assignee took no rights as against the
debtor when the contract provided that the creditor "shall not transfer
or assign nor attempt to transfer this Agreement or any right or obligation hereunder." The decision is consistent with the McLaughlin
case, but is contrary to the Uniform Commercial Code.11
§4.4. Finders' fees. When one merely brings to the attention of
another a possibility for making a profit, his right to recover compensation for this service is nebulous at best. Many of the cases in this
general area involve the presentation of "new ideas" to a going corporation. Davidson v. Robiel presented another typical factual situation
of this nature. The defendant had told the plaintiff to "keep his eyes
open for deals," as the defendant was interested in them, and had
promised that he would "take care" of the plaintiff. When the plaintiff informed the defendant of an opportunity to buy stock in a close
corporation, the defendant promised to pay him lO per cent of any
profit he might make on the deal. The defendant subsequently purchased it and sold it some years later at a substantial profit. In this
action the plaintiff sought compensation for having brought the possibility of the deal to the defendant's attention.
Although the Supreme Judicial Court found that there was insufficient evidence to prove either that the plaintiff was a broker, in the
sense that he was hired to negotiate, or that he had been the effective
cause of arranging the transaction, recovery by the plaintiff was affirmed on the ground that there was sufficient evidence to prove an
express contract. The most notable feature of the case is the willingness of the Court to leave the question of whether a contract existed to
the jury, even though the evidence was "imprecise" and "scanty." The
arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendant is of the type that
is as likely to be informally stated as it is to be written, and the Court's
opinion is highly commendable.
§4.5. Promise to pay debt discharged in bankruptcy. Howard v.
Zilch 1 presented a novel fact situation raising the question of whether
a check constitutes a sufficient written promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy. After the defendant's obligation to the plaintiff had been discharged, he made oral promises to pay the debt out
of an expected recovery from a tort claim against a third party. When
the tort action was settled, the defendant instructed his attorney to
make arrangements for payment of the discharged debt. His attorney
drew a check payable to both the defendant and the plaintiff and delivered it to the defendant who indorsed it and gave it to the plaintiff.
Soon thereafter the defendant asked his attorney to stop payment on
4 !145 Mass. 434. 187 N.E.2d 820 (196!1).
II See G.L., c. 106, §!l-ll8.
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the check, which was accomplished before the plaintiff received payment. In this action the plaintiff argued that the attorney's signature,
made as agent for the defendant, was sufficient to satisfy the statutory
requirement that promises to pay a discharged debt be in writing. The
Supreme .Judicial Court, demonstrating considerable facility in interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code, held that the drawer of a
check makes a promise to pay the amount of the check to any holder
and that this promise meets the requirements of the statute.
Because of the necessity of tying together several sections of the
Uniform Commercial Code to arrive at the conclusion that the drawer
of a check makes a "promise" to pay, the Court's opinion has an appearance of cleverness rather than depth. Since a check is basically a payment rather than a promissory instrument, initial reaction to the
opinion is that the Court was more impressed by technicalities than by
the underlying issue of whether this was the type of writing intended to
satisfy the statute. But when it is remembered that the writing requirement is primarily designed to assure that a promise was in fact
made, it must be admitted that a check is as good evidence of this
as can be obtained. Also, in the face of prior Massachusetts cases that
have.held that an informal promise contained in a letter is sufficient,2
it would be difficult to conclude that a check is less representative of
the debtor's serious intent to promise payment of the barred claim.
§4.6. Contracts between husbands and wives. In 1944, Frank W.
Grinnell asked the question "Why not allow written contracts between
husband and wife in Massachusetts?" 1 His own answer was a tentative draft act to permit such contracts, and his proposal was presently
introduced into the Senate. However, the .Judicial Council found a
reason to deny enforceability to contracts of husband and wife inter
se: the possibility of fraud on creditors. 2
The argument of the Judicial Council delayed the legislation for
some twenty years, but during the 1963 legislative session Mr. Grinnell's suggestion was adopted.3 Section 3 of Chapter 209 now provides:
"Husbands and wives may make contracts with each other, written,
oral, sealed or unsealed." 4
2 See Nathan v. Leland, 195 Mass. 576, 79 N.E. 795 (1907); Cook v. Shearman, 105
Mass. 21 (1869).

§4.6. 129 Mass. L.Q., No. 2. p. 29 (1944).
2 SO Mass. L.Q., No. 4, p. 20 (1945).
a G.L~ c. 209, §5, as amended by Acts of 1965, c. 765, §2.
4 The same act (Acu of 1963, c. 765) amended G.I .., c. W9, §6, to permit suits by
marriage pannen against one another on contracts permitted by G.L., c. 209, !j!I.

